Nature and the Historization of History - a Commentary by Eriksen, Anne
In his text, Kragh gives a brief but very
informative overview of the idea that
nature itself is historical, i.e. subject to
change over time. He includes a discussion
on whether even the natural laws them-
selves may be changing in this way, and
ends by asking if nature is “truly historical”
in the same way as human societies are. He
answers in the negative. One of the argu-
ments he uses is that while a historian can
think back in time and identify with the
historical actors, the scientist cannot in the
same way imagine being a dinosaur or a
molecule.
Kragh’s own narrative is historic. He
starts with early ideas about the world
being subjected to some kind of organic
decay or ageing, and goes on to the “much
too narrow time-scale” offered by the Bible.
Buffon and Kant are presented as examples
of thinkers who heroically break with this
limit, while the second law of thermody-
namics, from the mid 19thcentury, marks
the final entrance of an irreversible moder-
nity. It is difficult to structure this kind of
narrative without making it one of progress
and gradual development. Thus, historicity
follows two strands in Kragh’s text. It struc-
tures the description of how natural phe-
nomena were interpreted in new ways,
while at the same time these new ways
themselves are of just that historical kind
which used to present their gradual emer-
gence.
It is difficult to see how such a structure
could have been avoided, but it still can be
worth noting that it contributes to natural-
ize history. It seems to imply that the idea
of history has been constant in the Western
tradition, and that this idea – quite natu-
rally – is identical with our own. This, of
course, is not the case. For centuries, histo-
ry meant the description of things that were,
hence also the term natural history.
Modern ideas of history and historicity
emerged in exactly the same period as that
in which nature was historicized. From the
18th century onwards, history gradually
came to be understood in terms of time,
change, development, processes, even
progress. In earlier epochs, history had for
a large part been a narrative genre, fre-
quently concerned with matters of good
examples and parallelity between e.g. mo d -
ern princes and ancient models.
Historiography meant interpreting the
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present with the aid of examples from the
past, the analytical challenge being to find
the right example not just to explain the
present situation but also to seek advice as
to what should be done.
Classical theories about the ageing and
even the decay of the world were under-
stood in terms of a natural cycle, likening
the life of the world to the life of single
human beings. Over time, the soil had
become less fertile, and the “forces” of
nature less strong. These ideas were sum-
marized in the well-known figure of
mundus senescens – the old, feeble and age-
ing world. As late as the 18th century these
ideas were seriously discussed, not least
because the change and decay were also
interpreted in moral terms (Frängsmyr
2000). Humanity had degenerated since
the age of heroes, and nature with it. But
returning to the example of the ancestors
might give a means to rescue the world
from its present, rather unsatisfactory state.
Old theories might thus be employed to
propagate new industriousness and agricul-
tural and economic improvements.
The change towards a more modern
way of thinking about history, including
linear temporality and an understanding of
the future as neither determined by past
examples nor bound to an organic life
cycle, happened gradually – not only in
natural science but in general. And the
modern understanding of history was not a
model applied to natural history, it was in
part developed in that field. Steno’s studies
of fossils, Hutton’s of earth stratigraphy and
Buffon’s break with the biblical time limit
did not only contribute to the historization
of nature, but also to the historization of
history. New ways of thinking about natu-
ral phenomena and the impact of processes
taking time – frequently even time-spans of
so far unimagined length – also had far-
reaching consequences for the understand-
ing of the structure of social change, for the
character of the man-made world (Toulmin
& Goodfield 1965).
Incorporating such new ways of think-
ing into historiography did not come easy.
Nonetheless, the perspectives recently
developed within natural history – or the
natural sciences, as the term gradually came
to be – did provide help. Historians and
antiquarians followed the lead of the scien-
tists. The new theories of weathering, ero-
sion or post-glacial rebound represented
new ways of thinking about time, change
and stability, contingency and predictabili-
ty, even if the theories themselves did not
directly apply to social conditions. The his-
torization of history demanded consider-
able mental resources, as it seriously ques-
tioned a number of connections and
causalities traditionally taken for granted.
To illustrate some of the problems
involved, I would like to cite an example
from a Norwegian topographic text, from
1794. The military engineer E. Hoff tries
to explain why there is a pot-hole in a hill-
side, far from any sea or lake. How has it
been made, and by whom? In the
Norwegian vernacular, pot-holes are called
monks’ holes, and Hoff starts ascribing the
pothole to “the lazy and scheming monks”
of a pre-reformation past. But the explana-
tion does not satisfy him, and is also “some-
what insulting” to the monks, so Hoff tests
other explanations:
If the sea itself has once been the cause
of this hole in the solid rock – for a river
or stream cannot, according to the
nature of the present area, have existed
– one probably has to accept the theory
of the Swedish poet and historian O.
Dalin and others about water reduction,
according to whom, in particular Dalin,
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the sea in a period of approximately
1800 years decreases by 13 fathoms or
78 feet. But this requires a time of
approximately 9000 years back, which
is contrary to the almanac of the good
Moses as well as to all experience (Top.J,
bd.3, hft. 9, 1794:27).
The theories of water reduction were deve l -
oped by the Swede Anders Celsius and
widely publicised by the historian Olof von
Dalin in his work History of the Kingdom of
Sweden (1747–62). Dalin argues that the
present Sweden once had been a number of
small islands (Frängsmyr 2000). In Hoff ’s
case, the theory indicates that the pothole
must have been made more than 9000 years
ago, which he simply finds improbable,
given that the world was commonly accept-
ed to be about 6000 years old. Even if the
modern theories may be the most attractive,
Hoff finds it difficult to support them
“without being regarded as a heretic of
Biblical chronology.” He exclaims in deep
frustration:
How uncertain, how contradictory most
things are, in particular from the oldest
of times, which can now only be esti-
mated by guesses and not proven; for
how can the Mosaic accounts be com-
bined with the perhaps too exagge r ated
chronological calculations of the most
ancient peoples? The infallible ancient
monuments in Asia, Africa and especial-
ly Egypt seem to be far too discrepant
with the commonly accepted chronol -
ogy. The good Moses, no matter what a
great and excellent man he otherwise
was in his own time, must also probably
be excused if he was less of a
Chronologus than a legislator – for in
his time there was no Whiston (Top. J.
bd.3, hft. 9, 1794:39).
William Whiston, Newton’s successor in
Cambridge, attempted to reconcile biblical
accounts with new scientific knowledge. In
his book A New Theory of the Earth, from
1696, he argued that the events in the Old
Testament must be “decoded” as accounts
of historical events, the Flood being caused
by the passing of a large comet. Hoff him-
self seems to prefer the same kind of har-
monizing theories, but does not quite suc-
ceed. What worries him is not just chronol-
ogy and the relationship between history
and natural history. In Hoff ’s argument,
knowledge is bound to person, and person
to honour. Rejecting a theory or an expla-
nation implies rejecting the person related
to it, giving vent to a suspicion that this
person is untrustworthy and without hon-
our – an impostor or a fraud (see also
Eriksen 2007). Hoff ’s problem is not just
to reconcile a newly historicized nature
with old ideas about history, but also to
negotiate relationships between truth and
honour.
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